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Abstract - Monitoring and enforcement considerations 
have been largely ignored in the study of fishery 
management. This paper discusses this issue with a 
formal model to show the impacts of costly, imperfect 
enforcement of law on the behaviour of fishing firms 
and fisheries management. Theoretical analysis 
combines a standard bio-economic model of fisheries 
(Gordon/Schaefer) with Becker’s theory of Crime and 
Punishment. 
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1. Introduction. 
By definition, anything that is an infringement 
of the law is illegal. Illegal fishing therefore covers a 
wide range of behaviour, which can take place at 
different levels: local, national, and international. 
Illegal fishing has always existed, but, in recent 
decades, there has been a sharp rise in violating 
activities, due to several factors. Technical progress 
in motorization, freezing techniques, improved gear, 
new forms of stocks detection and information made 
it easier. But also, the new Law of the Sea (1982), 
generating a “creeping jurisdiction” process that 
seems to give an end to the principle of open access, 
is in the roots of this phenomenon. 
Obviously, it’s impossible to quantify or 
qualify infringements. They are known to take place 
at all levels and take different forms at different 
times; some violations are detected but many remain 
unnoticed. Infringements take the traditional forms of 
fishing over the quota or using non-permitted mesh-
size, but are also in situations of non-permitted by-
catches or transhipment, even in the fake world of 
convenience flags. The possibilities of fraud after 
landing are enormous. 
Illegal fishing is a problem because it 
undermines efforts to conserve and manage fish 
stocks. Destruction of fishing-grounds seriously 
harms efforts to replenish stocks and diminishes 
social perspectives about economic returns, in both 
the short and long term. 
The enforcement of Law is the other side of 
the mirror. The objective of monitoring and 
surveillance is to deter/detect infringements and to 
encourage compliance with the rules. The monitoring 
of fishing activities combines prevention, penalties 
and the development of a sense of responsibility. 
Fisheries control regimes aim to contribute to 
resource management as a complement of other tools 
of the conservation policy, to discourage the 
inclination to infringe regulation, guaranteeing fair 
and transparent enforcement, to impose penalties on 
wrongdoers and, incidentally, also helps improve 
scientific knowledge. 
In the context of Fisheries Economics, the 
monitoring problem can be seen as an externality 
arising when exclusive property rights are absent 
(Cheung, 1970). And that absence depends on, 
among other things, the costs of defining and 
enforcing exclusivity. Most of the literature on 
fisheries management and regulation implicitly 
assumes law can be perfectly and cost-less enforced. 
Even if such costs and imperfections are recognised 
they are not usually incorporated in the analysis to 
show how agents’ behaviour and management 
policies are affected by their presence. Despite the 
astute observations in the traditional literature (Scott, 
1979), enforcement considerations have been largely 
ignored in Fisheries Economics. 
This paper reviews the relevant literature and 
explores this issue with a formal model of fisheries 
law enforcement. Based on the mid-eighties analysis 
of Sutinen and Andersen, it combines the standard 
Gordon/Schaefer fisheries model with the insights of 








The paper has the following structure: 
In the first point the model is introduced. The 
agent behaviour in a situation of crime is discussed 
and a formulation of fisheries enforcement cost 
function is derived. The second point describes the 
optimal management policy when the enforcement 
costs are considered. Optimal control theory is 
introduced to solve the model and the results are 
discussed. In the third, the paper analyses the 
methods to improve compliance with fisheries 
regulation. Several policy prescriptions are made. 
2. The Model: Illegal Behaviour and 
Enforcement Costs 
Despite the enormous volume of literature on 
Fisheries Economics, only a few number of papers 
are devoted to the issue of enforcement. According to 
Sutinen and Hennessey (1986), it has always been 
“the neglected element in fishery management”.  
The fundamental problem in fisheries 
management is to obviate the tendency towards 
overexploitation of the resources under open access. 
Starting at any initial stock size, a means must be 
found to reduce catch rates. Regulation methods used 
to curb this tendency of overfishing and overcapacity 
includes gear restrictions, area and seasonal closures, 
TACs, ITQs, limiting entry and other forms of 
reducing fishing effort. 
Assume that, whatever means are applied to 
reduce catch rates, any catch level above the level of 
the permitted quota for a certain fishing, q*, is illegal. 
If we suppose a system of individual non-transferable 
quotas, the amount of the individual firm catch above 
its quota (qi – qi*) is illegal. 
If detected and convicted, a penalty fee is 
imposed on the firm in an amount given by f, 
    f = f (qi – qi*) 
where f >0, if qi > qi*  and f =0, otherwise;  
and f /q 0 ; 2f /q20 ;  qi > qi* . 
We assume that the function f(.) is continuous 
and differentiable for all qi* > qi.  
This penalty fee has a finite upper bound and 
each firm is assumed to face the same penalty fee 
schedule. 
 
An individual firm’s profit before penalty is 
given by 
    i (qi,x) = p qi – ci(qi,x), 
where p denotes the price of fish, x is the size of fish 
stock and c(.) is the cost function. We assume that 
firms are price takers. 
In an imperfect law enforcement regime not 
every violator is detected and convicted.  
Let the probability of detection and conviction 
be given by , and, to simplify, let us assume that all 
firms face the same probability. 
If detected and convicted of a violation, a 
firm’s profit will be  i(qi,x) - f (qi – qi*) ; 
if not,  i(qi,x). 
So, expected profits are 
1.  i(qi,x) - f (qi – qi*) + (1- ) i(qi,x) 
Assuming firms are risk neutral and 
maximising expected profits, each qi is determined by 
the first order condition (subscripts other than i 
denote partial derivatives) 
2. qi(qi,x)fq (qi – qi*)  
The solution to 2. for one form of the 
marginal penalty schedule, fq, lead to the following 
result: 
If there were no penalty for fishing beyond 
legal quota, or if there were no probability of being 
detected and convicted (f = 0 or  = 0) the firm 
would set its catch at the open access catch rate, qi0. 
For a given stock size (x), the firm sets its catch rate 
at a level in excess of its quota, where marginal 
profits equal the expected marginal penalty. 
The first order condition 2. can be solved for 
a firm catch rate, as qi = qi (, x, qi*). 
The catch rate also depends on price, 
production cost parameters and parameters of the 
penalty fee schedule, but these are suppressed for 




Note the following properties, important for 
the discussion1: 
 An increase in the probability of detection 
and conviction decreases, or leaves 
unchanged, a firm catch rate, as the expected 
marginal penalty schedule becomes steeper. 
 An increase in the stock size shifts up the 
marginal profit schedule and increases, or 
leaves unchanged, a firm’s catch rate. 
 An increase in the quota shifts the expected 
marginal penalty to the right and increases a 
firm’s catch, so long as the initial catch rate 
is inferior to the bionomic equilibrium (open 
access situation). 
Aggregating the catches for all firms in the 
fishery yields the aggregate catch function  
q = q (, x, q*),  
where q* = qi*, for the N firms operating in the 
fishing ground. 
Assuming there is a sufficient heterogeneity 
across firms to allow this equation to be continuous, 
therefore inverse forms exist and q/<0, q/x>0, 
q/q*>0. 
To detect and convict violators require inputs 
(aircraft, patrol vessels, police, and judicial 
personnel). Let the quantities of such inputs be 
represented by a vector k, which has an associated 
vector of unit prices w.  
The probability of detecting and convicting 
fraud is assumed to depend positively on the inputs. 
Assuming the least cost combination of k is chosen 
for each level of , there is an enforcement cost 
function e (), where e/>0, 2e/20, and, using 
the inverse, enforcement costs can be represented by 
E (q,x,q*).  
The following properties hold: 
A reduction in the catch level (below the open 
access level for a given size and quota) requires an 
increase in enforcement costs. 
Increase in the fish stock or quota requires 
greater enforcement costs to achieve a given catch 
level (note that this ignores some economies of scale 
in enforcement).  
                                                            
1 See Sutinen and Andersen (1985). 
 
The size of the quota also affects enforcement. 
3. Optimal Policy 
Now, we must investigate how optimal 
management policies are affected by costly, imperfect 
enforcement.  
Optimal policies are based on the usual 
criterion of maximising the discounted sum of net 
social benefits. In each period these net benefits are 
given by 
3. , ,  
 is the inverse demand function, ,  is the 
aggregate cost catch function and ,  is the 
enforcement cost function. 
The aggregate cost function depends on the 
fixed set of quotas and doesn’t include penalty fees. 
these are excluded since they are transfers from 
fishing firms to general treasury. 
Since quota allocation is assumed 
exogenously determined, ∗  is suppressed as 
argument in the enforcement cost function. 
We introduce now the usual stock dynamics 
standard differential equation, where  is the 
natural growth rate. 
4.  




subject to 4. 
First order conditions are 
   p-cq – Eq -  = 0 
 = cx + Ex + ( - Fx) 
 is the dynamic multiplier. 
Solving the problem, we are conducted to a 
transformed golden rule 
6.  - Fx** =  -(cx** + Ex**) /  p**-( cq** + Eq**) 
This determines the steady state optimal size 




We can derive interesting conclusions if we 
compare this, with the situation where we assume 
costless and perfect enforcement, that is, when catch 
rates are perfectly controlled at zero cost. In this case 
the condition for optimality is the usual modified 
golden rule2:    
 - Fx*** =  -cx***  / ( p***- cq***),  where x*** is 
the optimal stock size, q*** the optimal catch rate 
and p*** the resulting price. 
By comparing the two golden rules it can be 
concluded that: 
 the presence of costly, imperfect 
enforcement results in a smaller optimal 
stock size than otherwise: x** < x*** 
 similarly, higher enforcement costs result in 
a lower optimal stock. 
The rationale is not difficult to follow. 
Assuming that some kind of quota system is in effect 
to ration access, enforcement activity would involve 
monitoring compliance with these quotas and 
assigning penalties on those found in violation. If 
quotas were so large as being consistent with free 
access equilibrium, enforcement costs would be zero 
because no enforcement would be necessary to ensure 
compliance. But, moving away from free access 
equilibrium increases both net benefits and 
enforcement costs. For this model, as the steady-state 
population size is increased, marginal enforcement 
costs increase and marginal net benefits decrease. At 
the efficient population size, with enforcement costs, 
the net marginal benefit equals the marginal 
enforcement costs. This necessarily involves a 
smaller population size than the efficient population 
size ignoring enforcement costs, because the latter 
occurs when the marginal net benefit is zero 
(Tietenberg, 2003). 
Sutinen and Andersen (1985) also compare the 
catch rates for costless, perfect enforcement with 
costly, imperfect enforcement. They conclude that 
depends on whether the stock sizes are above or 
below the so-called MSY (Maximum Sustainable 
Level). For the most usual case, that is, 
x**<x***<xMSY, the catch rate in the situation of 
costly enforcement costs is lower than the case 




2 See Clark and Munro (1975) 
4. Enforcement and Compliance 
Besides the intrinsic value of the model 
important research questions are suggested.  
The enforcement issue points out another 
advantage of private property rights based 
management: they are self-enforcing. This may 
represent an important step to proceed in the 
discussion of regulatory instruments. First, if 
enforcement costs are significant, the more common 
forms of regulation (command and control tools as 
TACs, mesh size or areas/seasons closures, for 
example) should require further re-evaluation. 
Usually they are detracted because they are not 
economically efficient. But is also commonly 
recognised that costs of enforcement are weaker in 
these cases. 
Second, the analysis of Individual 
Transferable Quotas reveals the equivalence between 
ITQs and taxes. But, with the consideration of 
enforcement costs, this may not hold. The analysis of 
Sutinen and Andersen, with non-transferable quotas, 
appears to more closely parallel the case of taxes. 
Investigation on the ITQs case is still a work in 
progress. In any case, the reduced costs of 
enforcement favoured this tool. As the fishermen are 
given almost private property rights of resource use, 
this means that some kind of auto-regulation is 
guaranteed. In theory, this engages fishermen in 
compliance with the regulation and diminishes 
enforcement costs. In practice, the implementation of 
ITQs systems is confronted with a lot of problems 
including illegal behaviour (Copes, 1986). 
In another dimension, this approach also 
reveals the importance of empirical studies trying to 
estimate the factors that ensure compliance with the 
regulation. These studies give important basis for 
public authorities decision about the actions to be 
implemented. 
Stigler (1970) argues that public authorities 
have four basic means to improve compliance: 
 minimize  the chances that violations will go 
undetected, 
 maximize the probability that sanctions will 
follow the detection of violations, 
 speed up the process from time to detection 
to assignment of sanction, 
 make the sanctions large. 
There is dispute among experts about the best 
alternatives. Some scholars have argued that the 
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probability of being detected is more important than 
the size or magnitude of the sanction, while others 
argue that making the charging time follow as closely 
as possible to the detection of illegal behaviour is the 
most important factor in enhancing compliance. 
Others, also, put in evidence the level of expenditure 
oriented to monitoring activities.  
Empirical evidence? The difficulties in getting 
data to this kind of research are very problematic. But 
we stress the necessity of more studies3. 
Econometric studies have demonstrated that 
all factors are significant. Especially the one that 
states fishermen perceived probability of detection 
and conviction affects their violation rate as predicted 
by the theory. The higher the probability, the lower 
the rate of violation. So, enforcement and others 
measures of control to increase perceived 
probabilities, enhance compliance. 
Personal characteristics of fishermen also are 
expected to influence compliance behaviour. In the 
study of Sutinen and Gauvin (about lobstermen in 
Massachusetts) the pattern is that fishermen who 
have more illegal landings are thought to be older and 
to fish fewer days. At the same time they are thought 
to be in the fishery for the short term. This could be a 
portrait of a serious group of violators who are about 
to retire and are grasping at short-time gains because 
they do not feel they will be around to reap the long-
term benefits of conservation. But we can also expect 
that fishermen with more years in the fishery and 
more income dependent on a certain fishery have 
stronger conservation motives. So, studies must 
investigate these issues. 
5. Final Remark 
In the Portuguese case, after a significant 
process of modernization of the surveillance 
structures, several problems still persist. The 
European Commission gave the financial support to 
guarantee the indispensable means of surveillance 
and control and increased the deterrence capacity of 
control in member states (in a uniform way, which is 
important) and the transparency and trust between 
partners. That lead to the increase of the probability 
of detection as a means to deter criminal behaviour 
and increased compliance with regulation. But the 
differences in the judicial administration maintains. 
In the Portuguese case, the dispersion of surveillance 
and control activities between several agencies 
                                                            
3 See, for example, Sutinen and Hennessey (1986) or Sutinen and 
Gauvin (1989). 
(Maritime Authority, Ports Administration, different 
Policies’ corps) is, always, referred as a fundamental 
root of inefficiency. The stakeholders put, also, in 
evidence, the delayed application of regulation by the 
tribunals. 
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